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Abstract
In science, the most widespread statistical quantities are perhaps p-
values. A typical advice is to reject the null hypothesis H0 if the correspond-
ing p-value is sufficiently small (usually smaller than 0.05). Many criticisms
regarding p-values have arisen in the scientific literature. The main issue
is that in general optimal p-values (based on likelihood ratio statistics) are
not measures of evidence over the parameter space Θ. Here, we propose an
objective measure of evidence for very general null hypotheses that satisfies
logical requirements (i.e., operations on the subsets of Θ) that are not met
by p-values (e.g., it is a possibility measure). We study the proposed mea-
sure in the light of the abstract belief calculus formalism and we conclude
that it can be used to establish objective states of belief on the subsets of
Θ. Based on its properties, we strongly recommend this measure as an ad-
ditional summary of significance tests. At the end of the paper we give a
short listing of possible open problems.
Keywords: Abstract belief calculus, evidence measure, likelihood-based con-
fidence, nested hypothesis, p-value, possibility measure, significance test
1 Introduction
Tests of significance are subjects of intense debate and discussion among many
statisticians (Kempthorne, 1976; Cox, 1977; Berger and Sellke, 1987; Aitkin, 1991;
Schervish, 1996; Royall, 1997; Mayo and Cox, 2006), scientists in general (Dubois and Prade,
1990; Darwiche and Ginsberg, 1992; Friedman and Halpern, 1996; Wagenmakers,
2007) and philosophers of science (Stern, 2003; Mayo, 2004). In this paper, we
discuss some limitations of p-values (which is a well-explored territory) and we
propose an alternative measure to establish objective states of belief on the subsets
of the full parameter space Θ. Currently, many scholars have been studying the
controversies and limitations of p-values (see, for instance, Mayo and Cox, 2006;
1
Mayo and Spanos, 2006; Wagenmakers, 2007; Pereira et al., 2008; Rice, 2010; Grenda´r,
2012; Diniz et al., 2012) and others have proposed some alternatives (Zhang, 2009;
Bickel, 2012). In this paper, besides proposing an objective measure of evidence,
we also provide a connection with the abstract belief calculus (ABC) proposed
by Darwiche and Ginsberg (1992), which certifies the status of “objective state of
belief” for our proposal, see Section 4 for specific details.
A procedure that measures the consistency of an observed data x (the capital
letterX denotes the random quantity) with a null hypothesis H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 is known
as a significance test (Kempthorne, 1976; Cox, 1977). According to Mayo and Cox
(2006), to do this in the frequentist paradigm, we may find a function t = t(x)
called test statistic such that: (1) the larger the value of t the more inconsistent
are the data with H0 and (2) the random variable T = t(X) has known prob-
ability distributions (at least asymptotically) under H0. The p-value related to
the statistic T (the observed level of significance Cox, 1977) is the probability of
an unobserved T to be, at least, as extreme as the observed t, under H0. In the
statistical literature is common to informally define p-values as
p(Θ0) = P (T > t; under H0), (1)
see, for instance, Mayo and Cox (2006). Notice that, small values of p indicate a
discordance of the data probabilistic model from that specified in H0. It is com-
mon practice to set in advance a threshold value α to reject H0 if and only if p ≤ α.
The informal definition in Equation (1) leads to mistaken interpretations and can
feed many controversies, since one is driven to think that the measure P and the
statistic T does not depend upon the null set Θ0. Some of the critics against
the use of p-values follow. Pereira and Wechsler (1993) point out some problems
when the statistic T does not consider the alternative hypothesis. Schervish (1996)
had argued that p-values as measures of evidence for hypotheses has serious logi-
cal flaws. Berger and Sellke (1987) argue that p-values can be highly misleading
measures of the evidence provided by the data against the null hypothesis.
In this paper, we provide a formal definition of p-values and present two ex-
amples where conflicting conclusions arise if p-values are used to take decisions
regarding the inadequacy of a hypothesis. Then, we propose a measure of evidence
for general null hypotheses that is free of those conflicts and has some important
philosophical implications in the frequentist paradigm which will be detailed in
future works.
Here, the null hypothesis is defined in a parametric context, let θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rk
be the model parameter, the null hypothesis is defined as H0 : θ ∈ Θ0. One
interpretation is: “H0 is considered true when the true unknown value of the
parameter vector lies in the subset Θ0 ⊆ Θ”. A second interpretation reads:
2
“H0 is considered true when the probability measures indexed by the elements of
Θ0 ⊆ Θ explain more efficiently the random events than the probability measures
indexed by the elements of Θc0 = Θ − Θ0”, where more efficiently is relative
to certain criteria. Basically, a hypothesis test attempts to reduce a family of
possible measures that governs the data behavior, say PX = {µθ : θ ∈ Θ}, to a
more restricted one, say P0X = {µθ : θ ∈ Θ0}.
In the following we define a p-value precisely, then we can properly understand
some of its features. Let PX = {µθ; θ ∈ Θ} be a family of probability measures
induced by the random sample X . In optimal tests, the reader should notice that
the statistic T for testing H0 depends, in general, on the null set Θ0, thus it
should be read as TΘ0 instead of T . In order to avoid further misunderstandings,
we decided to take into account this index from now on. As TΘ0 is a function
of the random sample we also have an induced family of probability measures
PTΘ0 = {Pθ,Θ0 ; θ ∈ Θ}, where Pθ,Θ0 ≡ µθT−1Θ0 is a measure that depends on the
null set Θ0 and the parameter vector θ. The informal statement “underH0” means
a subfamily of probability measures restricted to the null set, namely P0TΘ0 =
{Pθ,Θ0; θ ∈ Θ0}. Then, it is possible to define many p-values as we can see below
pθ(Θ0) = Pθ,Θ0(TΘ0 > t), for θ ∈ Θ0
and the most conservative p-value over Θ0 can be defined as
p(Θ0) = sup
θ∈Θ0
pθ(Θ0).
When Pθ,Θ0 ≡ PΘ0 for all θ ∈ Θ0, i.e., the statistic TΘ0 is ancillary to the
family P0T , then all p-values are equal: pθ′ (Θ0) = pθ′′ (Θ0) for all θ
′
, θ
′′ ∈ Θ0 (see
Examples 1.1 and 1.2). If Pθ,Θ0 ≡ PΘ0 for all θ ∈ Θ0 happen asymptotically we
say that TΘ0 is asymptotically ancillary to P0T . As it is virtually impracticable
in complex problems to find exact probability measures Pθ,Θ0 for all θ ∈ Θ0
we can use the asymptotic distribution, that is, PΘ0 is the probability measure
correspondent to the asymptotic distribution of TΘ0 .
There are many ways to find a test statistic TΘ0 , it essentially depends on
the topologies of Θ0 and Θ. When Θ0 and its complement have one element
each, the Neyman-Pearson Lemma provides the most powerful test (which is the
likelihood ratio statistic) for any pre-fixed significance value. Naturally, we can
use this statistic to compute a p-value. For the general case, the generalization of
likelihood ratio statistic (which will be called only by likelihood ratio statistic) is
given by
λΘ0(x) =
supθ∈Θ0 L(θ, x)
supθ∈Θ L(θ, x)
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where L(θ, x) is the likelihood function. The testing statistic can be defined as
TΘ0 = −2 log(λΘ0 (X)), since this has important asymptotic properties as we will
see below. Observe that the likelihood ratio statistic does take into account the al-
ternative hypothesis (since Θ = Θ0∪Θ1 with Θ1 being the parameter space defined
in the alternative hypothesis). Mudholkar and Chaubey (2009) studied optimal p-
values for very general null hypotheses (considering both one and two-sided null
hypotheses) that take into account the corresponding alternative hypotheses, some
of these optimal p-values are computed by using likelihood ratio statistics. The
reader should notice that the likelihood ratio statistic is a generalization for uni-
formly most powerful tests (see Birkes, 1990) under general hypothesis testing.
For general linear hypothesis, H0 : Cθ = d, we can also resort to a Wald-type
statistic
W (x) = (Cθ̂ − d)⊤[CAC⊤]−1(Cθ̂ − d)
with θ̂ being a consistent estimator that, under H0, is (asymptotically) normally
distributed and A its (asymptotic) covariance-variance matrix computed at θ̂.
These two statistics share many important properties and are widely used in actual
problems. Suppose that X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is an independent and identically
distributed (iid) random sample, under some regular conditions on L(θ,X) and
when Θ0 is a smooth (semi)algebraic manifold with dim(Θ0) < dim(Θ), it is well
known that, under H0, TΘ0(X) = −2 log(λΘ0(X)) converges in distribution to a
chisquare distribution with r degrees of freedom (from now on, it is denoted just
by χ2r), where r = dim(Θ)− dim(Θ0) is the co-dimension of Θ0. The asymptotic
distribution of W (X) is a chisquare with rank-of-C degrees of freedom, which is
the very same of the likelihood ratio statistics for linear general null hypotheses.
We can also mention the Score test statistics that, under appropriated conditions,
has asymptotically the same distribution as the two previous statistics. That is,
different p-values can be computed for the same problem of hypothesis testing by
using different procedures. In this paper we shall only use the procedure based
on the (generalized) likelihood ratio statistics, since it has optimal asymptotic
properties (see Bahadur and Raghavachari, 1972). From now on, “asymptotic p-
values” means p-values computed by using the asymptotic distribution of the test
statistic.
Sometimes practitioners have to test a complicated hypothesisH01. By reasons
of easiness of computations, instead of testing H01, they may think of testing
another auxiliar hypothesis H02 such that if H02 is false then H01 is also false.
This procedure is used routinely in medicine and health fields in general, e.g., in
genetic studies one of the interests is to test genotype frequencies between two
groups (Izbicki et al., 2012). In this example, we know that H01 : “homogeneity
of genotype frequencies between the groups” implies H02 : “homogeneity of allelic
4
frequencies between the groups”. By using mild logical requirements, if we find
evidence against H02 we expect to claim evidence against H01. However, as it is
widely known, p-values do not follow this logical reasoning.
Let H01 : θ ∈ Θ01 and H02 : θ ∈ Θ02 be two null hypotheses such that Θ01 ⊆
Θ02, i.e., H01 is nested within H02. It is expected by the logical reasoning to find
more evidence against H01 than H02 for the same observed data X = x. In other
words, if pi is the asymptotic p-value computed underH0i, for i = 1, 2, respectively,
then we expect to observe p1 < p2. However, if dimensions of the spaces described
in these nested hypotheses are different, then their respective asymptotic p-values
will be computed under different metrics and therefore inverted conclusions may
occur, i.e., more disagreement with H02 than H01 (i.e., p2 < p1). That is to say,
for a given data and a preassigned α, it may happen p1 > α and p2 < α. One,
therefore, may be confronted at the same time with “evidence” to reject H02 and
without “evidence” to reject H01. Of course, the problem here is not with the
approximation for the p-values, computed by using limiting reference distribution,
the problem also happens with the exact ones. The example below shows the
above considerations for exact p-values in a multiparametric scenario.
Example 1.1. Consider an independent and identically distributed random sam-
ple X = (X1, . . . , Xn) where X1 ∼ N2(µ, I) with µ = (µ1, µ2)⊤ and I is a (2× 2)
identity matrix. The full parameter space is Θ = {(µ1, µ2) : µ1, µ2 ∈ R} = R2.
For this example we consider two particular hypotheses. Firstly, suppose that we
want to test H01 : θ ∈ Θ01, where Θ01 = {(0, 0)}, then the likelihood ratio statistic
is
λΘ01(X) =
supθ∈Θ01 L(θ,X)
supθ∈Θ L(θ,X)
= exp
(
− n
2
X¯⊤X¯
)
,
where X¯ is the sample mean. Taking TΘ01(X) = −2 log(λΘ01 (X)) we know that,
under H01, TΘ01 ∼ χ22. Secondly, suppose that the null hypothesis is H02 : θ ∈ Θ02,
where Θ02 ≡ {(µ1, µ2) : µ1 = µ2, µ1, µ2 ∈ R}, the likelihood ratio statistic is
λΘ02(X) =
supθ∈Θ02 L(θ,X)
supθ∈Θ L(θ,X)
= exp
(
− n
2
X¯⊤(I − 1
2
ll⊤)X¯
)
,
where l = (1, 1)⊤. Taking TΘ02(X) = −2 log(λ2(X)) it is possible to show that, un-
der H02, TΘ02 ∼ χ21. Notice that, in this example, the Wald statistics for these two
null hypotheses H01 and H02 are equal to TΘ01 and TΘ02 , respectively. Assume that
the sample size is n = 100 and the observed sample mean is x¯ = (0.14,−0.16)⊤,
then TΘ01(x) = 4.52 (with p-value p1 = 0.10) and TΘ02(x) = 4.5 (with p-value
p2 = 0.03). These p-values showed evidence against µ1 = µ2, but not against
µ1 = µ2 = 0. However, if we reject that µ1 = µ2 we should technically reject that
µ1 = µ2 = 0 (using the very same data).
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This issue does not happen only with the likelihood ratio statistic, it happens
with many other classical test statistics (score and others) that consider how data
should behave under H0. As p-values are just probabilities to find unobserved
statistics, at least, as large as the observed ones, the conflicting conclusion pre-
sented in the above example is not a logical contradiction of the frequentist method.
This issue happens because a p-value was not designed to be a measure of evidence
over subsets of Θ. We must say that p-values do exactly the job they were defined
to do. However, in the practical scientific world, researches use p-values to take
decisions and, hence, they eventually may face some problems with consistency of
conclusions. P-values must therefore be used with caution when taking decisions
about a null hypothesis.
The example below presents a data set which produces surprising conclusions
for regression models.
Example 1.2. Consider a linear model: y = xb + e, where b = (b1, b2)
⊤ is a
vector formed by two regression parameters, x = (x1, x2) is an (n × 2) matrix
of covariates and e ∼ Nn(0, In) with In the n × n identity matrix. It is usual
to verify if each component of b is equal to zero and to remove from the model
the non-significant parameters. The majority of statistical routines present the p-
values for H0i : bi = 0, say pi, for i = 1, 2. However, sometimes both p-values are
greater than α and there exists a joint effect that cannot be discarded. As these
hypotheses include a more restricted one, H03 : b = 0, it is of general advice to
reject H03 only if the p-value p3 is smaller than α (this decision obeys the logical
reasoning). We expect to observe more evidence against H03 than either H01 and
H02. In fact, almost always the p-value p3 is smaller than both p1 and p2, as
expected. However, as we shall see below, an inversion of conclusions may occur.
To see that, let us present the main ingredients. The maximum likelihood estimator
of b is b̂ = (x⊤x)−1x⊤y and the likelihood ratio statistics for testing H01, H02 and
H03 are respectively
λΘ0i(y, x) = exp
(
− 1
2
y⊤
(
x(x⊤x)−1x⊤ − x˙i(x˙⊤i x˙i)−1x˙⊤i
)
y
)
for i = 1, 2 and
λΘ03 (y, x) = exp
(
− 1
2
y⊤x(x⊤x)−1x⊤y
)
,
where x˙1 = x2 and x˙2 = x1. It can be showed that TΘ0i(Y, x) = −2 log(λΘ0i(Y, x)) ∼
χ2si for all i = 1, 2, 3, where, for this example, s1 = s2 = 1 and s3 = 2. Again, al-
though TΘ03 > TΘ0i , for i = 1, 2, the metrics to compute the p-values are different
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and odd behavior may arise as we notice in the following data,
y −1.29 1.09 −0.16 0.44 −0.22 −1.85 0.91 0.54 0.06 0.37
x1 3.00 8.00 5.00 9.00 10.00 1.00 6.00 9.00 6.00 5.00
x2 9.00 7.00 7.00 10.00 7.00 8.00 6.00 6.00 3.00 2.00
Here, the observed three statistics are tΘ01 = 4.48 (with p-value p1 = 0.03), tΘ02 =
4.00 (with p-value p2 = 0.045) and tΘ03 = 4.59 (with p-value p3 = 0.10). For these
data, we have problems with the conclusion, since we expected to have much more
evidence against H03 than H01 and H02. Notice that, p3/p1 ∼ 3.3 and p3/p2 ∼ 2.2.
Many other examples for higher dimensions can be built on, but we think that
these two instances are sufficient to illustrate the weakness of p-values when it
comes to decide acceptance or rejection of specific hypotheses, for other examples
we refer the reader to Schervish (1996). In the above examples, we used the
very same procedure to test both hypotheses H01 and H02 (i.e., likelihood ratio
statistics). Some scientists and practitioners would become confused with these
results and it would be very difficult explain to them the reason for that. We
believe that the development of a true measure of evidence for null hypotheses
that does not have these problems might be welcome by the scientific community.
In summary: in usual frequentist significance tests, a general method of com-
puting test statistics can be used (likelihood ratio statistics, Wald-type statistics,
Score statistic and so forth). The distribution of the chosen test statistic depends
on the null hypothesis and this leads to different metrics in the computation of
p-values (this is the major factor that gives the basis for the frequentist inter-
pretations of p-values). As each of these metrics depend on the dimension of the
respective null hypotheses, conflicting conclusions may arise for nested hypotheses.
In the next section, we present a new measure that can be regarded as a measure
of evidence for null hypotheses without committing any logical contradictions.
This paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2 we present a definition of evidence
measure and propose a frequentist version of this measure. Some of its properties
are presented in Section 3. A connection with the abstract belief calculus is showed
in Section 4. Examples are offered in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss
the main results and present some final remarks.
2 An evidence measure for null hypotheses
In this section we define a very general procedure to compute a measure of
evidence for H0. The concept of evidence was discussed by Good (1983) in a
great philosophical detail. We also refer the reader to Royall (1997) and its review
Vieland et al. (1998) for relevant arguments to develop new methods of measuring
7
evidence. As in the previous section, H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 is the null hypothesis, where
Θ0 ⊆ Θ ⊆ Rk is a smooth manifold. Below, we define what we mean by an
objective evidence measure.
Definition 2.1. Let X ⊆ Rn be the sample space and P(Θ) the power set of Θ. A
function s : X × P(Θ)→ [0, 1] is a measure (we shall write just s(Θ0) ≡ s(X,Θ0)
for shortness of notation, where X ∈ X is the data) of evidence of null hypotheses
if the following items hold
1. s(∅) = 0 and s(Θ) = 1,
2. For any two null hypotheses H01 : θ ∈ Θ01 and H02 : θ ∈ Θ02, such that
Θ01 ⊆ Θ02, we must have s(Θ01) ≤ s(Θ02),
The above definition is the least we would expect from a coherent measure
of evidence. Items 1 and 2 of Definition 2.1 describe a plausibility measure
(Friedman and Halpern, 1996), which generalizes probability measures. As showed
in the previous section, p-values are not even plausibility measures on Θ, since Con-
dition 2 of Definition 2.1 is not satisfied. Therefore, they cannot be regarded as
measures of evidence. Bayes factors are also not plausibility measures on Θ, i.e.,
Condition 2 fails to be held, (see Lavine and Schervish, 1999; Bickel, 2012). As
pointed out by a referee, based on Definition 2.1, many measures can be qualified
as a measure of evidence, even posterior probabilities. Here we restrict ourselves
to be objective in the sense that no prior distributions neither over Θ nor for H0
are specified, i.e., that the strength of evidence does not vary from one researcher
to another (Bickel, 2012). Moreover, the proposed measure of evidence should
be invariant under reparametrizations, this is an important feature to guarantee
that the measure of evidence is not dependent upon different parametrizations of
the model. In order to find a purely objective measure of evidence with these
characteristics, without prior distributions neither over Θ nor H0, we define a
likelihood-based confidence region by
Definition 2.2. A likelihood-based confidence region with level α is
Λα = {θ ∈ Θ : Tθ ≤ Fα},
where Tθ = 2(ℓ(θ̂) − ℓ(θ)), θ̂ = arg supθ∈Θ ℓ(θ) is the maximum likelihood estima-
tor, ℓ is the log-likelihood function and Fα is an 1 − α quantile computed from a
cumulative distribution function F , i.e., F (Fα) = 1 − α. Here, F is (an approx-
imation for) the cumulative distribution function of the random variable Tθ0 that
does not depend on θ0, where θ0 is the true value.
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Notice that, the cumulative distribution of Tθ0 is given by
F (t) = Pθ0(Tθ0 ≤ t).
Here, we assume that it is free of θ0 (otherwise, consider the asymptotic approxi-
mation).
As aforementioned, some of the optimal p-values studied by Mudholkar and Chaubey
(2009) are explicitly based on likelihood ratio statistics and this motives the use of
the likelihood-based confidence region to build our measure of evidence. Moreover,
as pointed out by a referee, Sprott (2000) provides examples for confidence regions
not based on likelihood functions that produce absurd regions. They are strong
cases for using likelihood-confidence regions, i.e., confidence regions that are based
on likelihood functions.
Below we define an evidence measure for the null hypothesis H0.
Definition 2.3. Let Λα be the likelihood-based confidence region. The evidence
measure for the null hypothesis H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 is the function s : X × P(Θ)→ [0, 1]
such that
s = s(Θ0) ≡ s(X,Θ0) = max{0, sup{α ∈ (0, 1) : Λα ∩Θ0 6= ∅}}.
We shall call s-value for short.
In a first draft of this paper we call this by q-value, but in the final version a
referee suggested to change by s-value. We can interpret the value s as the greatest
significance level for which at least one point of the closure of Θ0 lies inside the
confidence region for θ. When F is continuous, a simple way of computing an
s-value is to build high-confidence regions for θ that includes at least one point of
the closure of Θ0 and gradually decreases the confidence until the (1− s)× 100%
confidence region border intercepts just the last point(s) of the closure of Θ0. The
value s is such that the (1− s+ δ)× 100% confidence region does not include any
points of Θ0, for any δ > 0. Figure 1 illustrates some confidence regions Λα for
θ = (θ1, θ2) considering different values of α. The dotted line is Λs1 , where s1 is
the s-value for testing H01 : θ1 = 0. The dot-dashed line is Λs2 , where s2 is the
s-value for testing H02 : θ2 = 0. The dashed line is Λs3 , where s3 is the s-value for
testing H03 : θ
2
1+θ
2
2 = 1. In Dubois et al. (2004) is studied measures of confidence
and confidence relations in a general fashion, here we shall show that our measure
satisfies all confidence relations described by the authors.
It must be said that p-values and confidence regions are naturally related when
H0 is simple and specifies the full vector of parameters. We will see that, in this
precise case, s-values and p-values are the very same; on the other hand, if H0 is
simple and specifies just a partition of θ, then s-values and p-values will be differ-
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ent. Also, when H0 is composed (or specifies parameter curvatures) tests based on
confidence regions are not readily defined. Our approach is a generalization of tests
based on confidence regions under general composed null hypotheses. We shall see
that this procedure has many interesting properties, is logically consistent and has
a simple interpretation. We hope that these features would draw the attention of
the statistical community for this new way to conduct tests of hypotheses.
Mauris et al. (2001) proposed a possibility measure based on confidence inter-
vals to deal with fuzzy expression of uncertainty in measurement. This proposal
is compatible with recommended guides on the expression of uncertainty. The
authors consider “identify each confidence interval of level 1− α, with each α-cut
of a fuzzy subset, which thus gathers the whole set of confidence intervals in its
membership function” (Mauris et al., 2001). The goals of the latter paper are
different from those of this present paper, moreover the authors did not prove
the properties of their proposed measure, which naturally depend on type of the
adopted confidence intervals. Here, instead of considering confidence intervals,
we consider regions of confidence and connects this general formulation to quan-
tify the evidence yielded by data for or against the null hypothesis. In addition,
we prove the properties that are essential for evidence measures considering this
general formulation.
Observe that a large value of s(Θ0) indicates that there exists at least one
point in Θ0 that is near the maximum likelihood estimator, that is, data are not
discrediting the null hypothesis H0. Otherwise, a small value of s(Θ0) means that
all points of Θ0 are far from the maximum likelihood estimator, that is, data are
discrediting the null hypothesis. The metric that says what is near or far from θ̂ is
the (asymptotic) distribution of Tθ. These statements are readily seen by drawing
confidence regions (or intervals) with different confidence levels, see Figure 1.
Bickel (2012) developed a method based on the law of likelihood to quantify
the weight of evidence for one hypothesis over another. Here, we proposed a clas-
sical possibility measure over Θ based on likelihood-based confidence regions, see
Definition 2.3. Although these approaches are based on similar concepts, they
capture different values from the data (we do not investigate this further in the
present paper). As pointed out by a referee: “the proposed evidence measure
relates to that proposed by Bickel (2012) and Zhang (2009) via a monotone trans-
formation determined by F . Because F is fixed for a given model, there is an
equivalence (up to a monotone transformation) between the two measures within
each parametric model. However, since F may change in different models (depend-
ing on the dimension of θ, for instance), these two measures are not universally
equivalent.” This will be carefully investigate in further works. Another evidence
measure that is a Bayesian competitor is the FBST (Full Bayesian Significance
Test) proposed originally by Pereira and Stern (1999). See also an invariant ver-
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sion under reparametrizations in Madruga et al. (2003) and we refer the reader to
Pereira et al. (2008) for an extensive review of this latter method.
3 Some important properties
In this section we show some important properties of s-values that will be used
to connect them with possibility measures and the abstract belief calculus (see
Section 4). First consider the following conditions:
C1. θ̂ is an interior point of Θ,
C2. ℓ is strictly concave.
Our first theorem states that item 1 of Definition 2.1 holds for the proposed
s-value.
Theorem 3.1. Let s be an s-value and consider condition C1, then s(∅) = 0 and
s(Θ) = 1.
Proof. As θ̂ ∈ Θ (see condition C1), we have that {α ∈ (0, 1) : Λα ∩ Θ 6=
∅} = (0, 1) and then s(Θ) = 1. Also, {α ∈ (0, 1) : Λα ∩ ∅ 6= ∅} = ∅, then
s(∅) = max{0, sup(∅)} = 0.
The following theorem completes the requirement for the s-value to be a mea-
sure of evidence.
Theorem 3.2. (Nested hypotheses) For a fixed data X = x , let H01 : θ ∈ Θ01 and
H02 : θ ∈ Θ02 be two null hypotheses such that Θ01 ⊆ Θ02. Then, s(Θ01) ≤ s(Θ02),
where s(Θ01) and s(Θ02) are evidence measures for H01 and H02, respectively.
Proof. Observe that if Θ01 ⊆ Θ02, then Λα ∩ Θ01 ⊆ Λα ∩ Θ02 and {α ∈ (0, 1) :
Λα ∩Θ01 6= ∅} ⊆ {α ∈ (0, 1) : Λα ∩Θ02 6= ∅}. We conclude that s(Θ01) ≤ s(Θ02)
for all Θ01 ⊆ Θ02 ⊆ Θ.
Other important feature of our proposal is its invariance under reparametriza-
tions. As likelihood-based confidence regions are invariant under reparametriza-
tions (see Schweder and Hjort, 2002), the s-value is also invariant. Based on The-
orem 3.2 we can establish now an interesting result which is related to the Burden
of Proof, namely, the evidence in favour of a composite hypothesis is the most
favourable evidence in favour of its terms (Stern, 2003).
Lemma 3.1. (Most Favourable Interpretation) Let I be a countable or uncountable
real subset, assume that Θ0 =
⋃
i∈I Θ0i is nonempty, then s(Θ0) = supi∈I{s(Θ0i)}.
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Proof. By Theorem 3.2, we know that s(Θ0) ≥ s(Θ0i) for all i ∈ I, then s(Θ0) ≥
supi∈I{s(Θ0i)}. To prove this lemma, we must show that s(Θ0) ≤ supi∈I{s(Θ0i)}.
Define A(B) = {α ∈ (0, 1) : Λα ∩B 6= ∅} and note that A(Θ0) ⊆
⋃
i∈I A(Θ0i).
Therefore, sup(A(Θ0)) ≤ sup
(⋃
i∈I A(Θ0i)
)
⇒ sup(A(Θ0)) ≤ supi∈I{sup(A(Θ0i))}
and s(Θ0) = supi∈I{s(Θ0i)}.
Lemma 3.1 states that s-values are possibility measures on Θ, since they satisfy
property in Lemma 3.1 plus the conditions in Definition 2.1 (Dubois and Prade,
1990; Dubois, 2006). Next lemma presents an important result (for strictly concave
log-likelihood functions), which allows us to connect s-values with p-values.
Lemma 3.2. Assume valid conditions C1 and C2. For a nonempty Θ0 and F
continuous and strictly increasing, the s-value can alternatively be defined as
s(Θ0) = sup
θ∈Θ0
(1 − F (Tθ)) = 1− F
(
TΘ0
)
, (2)
where Tθ = 2(ℓ(θ̂)− ℓ(θ)), TΘ0 = 2(ℓ(θ̂)− ℓ(θ̂0)) and θ̂0 = arg supθ∈Θ0 ℓ(θ).
Proof. If Θ0 is nonempty, there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that Λα ∩ Θ0 6= ∅ and the
s-value is just s(Θ0) = sup{α ∈ (0, 1) : Λα∩Θ0 6= ∅}. Notice that, as F is strictly
increasing, we have that
Λα ∩Θ0 ≡ {θ ∈ Θ0 : Tθ ≤ Fα}
≡ {θ ∈ Θ0 : F (Tθ) ≤ 1− α}
≡ {θ ∈ Θ0 : 1− F (Tθ) ≥ α}.
As ℓ is strictly concave, then for all 0 < α ≤ s ≤ 1 we have Λs ∩ Θ0 ⊆ Λα ∩ Θ0
and
sup{α ∈ (0, 1) : Λα ∩Θ0 6= ∅} = sup
θ∈Θ0
{1− F (Tθ)}
and as F is continuous and strictly increasing
sup
θ∈Θ0
{1− F (Tθ))} = 1− F (TΘ0),
where Tθ = 2(ℓ(θ̂)− ℓ(θ)), TΘ0 = 2(ℓ(θ̂)− ℓ(θ̂0)) and θ̂0 = arg supθ∈Θ0 ℓ(θ).
Lemma 3.2 basically states that our proposed measure is isomorphic to the like-
lihood statistic when F is continuous and strictly increasing and the log-likelihood
function ℓ is strictly concave. This lemma connects our proposal with the work of
Dubois et al. (1997) and then, if the assumptions of this lemma hold, all results
derived by these authors are also valid for our proposal.
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The value of θ̂0 can be seen as the point of Θ0 which is in the boundary of
(1−s)×100% confidence region for θ. Notice that if F is a non-decreasing function
then we just can claim that
{θ ∈ Θ0 : Tθ ≤ Fα} ⊆
{
θ ∈ Θ0 : F (Tθ) ≤ 1− α
}
,
the converse inclusion may not be valid. Typically, F can be approximated to a
quisquare distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k is the dimension of Θ
(this is a continuous and strictly increasing function). Based upon this alternative
version we can directly compare s-values with p-values. In addition, it is possible
to derive the distribution of s.
Notice that, for one-sided null hypotheses H0 and monotonic likelihood ratio,
the corresponding p-value would be easily computed by
p = PΘ0(TΘ0 > tΘ0) = 1− FH0(tΘ0),
where FH0(tΘ0) = PΘ0(TΘ0 ≤ tΘ0) is the (asymptotic) cumulative distribution
of TΘ0 that depends on H0 (see Mudholkar and Chaubey, 2009) and tΘ0 is the
observed value of TΘ0 . Now, by Equation (2), we find a duality between s-values
and p-values which is self-evident from Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.3. Consider valid conditions C1 and C2. If F and FH0 are continu-
ous and strictly increasing functions and H0 is an one-sided hypothesis, then the
following equalities hold
p = 1− FH0(F−1(1− s)) and s = 1− F (F−1H0 (1− p)). (3)
When H0 is a two-sided hypothesis, then the relation between the s-value
and the p-value is different, but in this paper we do not investigate this fur-
ther. Also, optimal p-values when the null hypothesis is two-sided is proposed
by Mudholkar and Chaubey (2009), a connection with s-values might be studied
in further works. Note that, under general regularity conditions on the likeli-
hood function and considering that Θ0 is a smooth semi-algebraic subset of Θ, all
asymptotics for the s-value can be derived by using the duality relation presented
above in Equation 3.
As for the case where TΘ0 is not (asymptotically) ancillary to P0T , the most
conservative p-value computed by using the likelihood ratio statistic
p(Θ0) = sup
θ∈Θ0
Pθ,Θ0(TΘ0 > tΘ0) = sup
θ∈Θ0
(1 − Pθ,Θ0(TΘ0 ≤ tΘ0)) = 1− F ∗H0 (tΘ0)
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where
F ∗H0 (tΘ0) = infθ∈Θ0
Pθ,Θ0(TΘ0 ≤ tΘ0)
is a cumulative function the depends on H0 and if it is continuous and strictly
increasing Lemma 3.3 is applicable.
In usual frequentist significance tests, the error probability of type I character-
izes the proportion of cases in which a null hypothesis H0 would be rejected when
it is true in a hypothetical long-run of repeated sampling. On the one hand, as
a p-value usually has uniform distribution under H0, the probability to obtain a
p-value smaller than α is α. On the other hand, we can only guarantee uniform
distribution for the evidence value s under the simple null hypothesis Θ0 = {θ0},
which specifies all parameters involved in the model. Since, it can be readily seen
that if Θ0 = {θ0}, then F ≡ FH0 (an asymptotic quisquare with k degrees of
freedom) and therefore s ∼ U(0, 1) (at least asymptotically). However, if Θ0 has
dimension less than k, e.g., under curvature of parameters, the distribution FH0
would differ from F . Notice that the threshold value α adopted for p-values is
not valid for s-values, the actual threshold for s-values should be computed using
relation (3), i.e., αH0 = 1 − F (F−1H0 (1 − α)) would be the new cut-off. Of course,
if the decision was based on this actual threshold, the same logical contradictions
would arise.
Pereira et al. (2008) left a challenge to the reader, namely, to obtain the one-
to-one relationship between the evidence value computed via FBST (e-value) and
p-values. Diniz et al. (2012) showed that asymptotically the answer is given in
Lemma 3.3 replacing the s-value with e-value, therefore, s-values and e-values are
asymptotically equivalent. Polansky (2007) proposed an observed confidence ap-
proach for testing hypotheses, however this approach differs from ours because, as
stated on its Section 2.2 (The General Case), the proposed measure must satisfy
the probability axioms. As we have seen, the s-value does not satisfy the prob-
ability axioms, instead it satisfies the possibility axioms. Also, Polansky (2007)
seems to build confidence regions around the null set Θ0, which is a very different
approach from the one we are proposing in this paper.
4 S-value as an objective state of belief
In this section we analyze the definition of s-values under the light of Abstract
Belief Calculus (ABC) proposed by Darwiche and Ginsberg (1992). ABC is a
symbolic generalization of probabilities. Probability is a function defined over a
family of subsets (known as σ-field) of a main nonempty set Ω to the interval [0, 1].
The additivity is the main characteristic of this function of subsets, that is, if A
and B are disjoint measurable subsets, then the probability of the union A ∪ B
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is the sum of their respective probabilities. Basically, all theorems of probability
calculus require this additive property. Cox (1946) derived this sum rule from a
set of more fundamental axioms (see also Jaynes, 1957; Aczel, 2004), which tries
to consider the following assertions
“... the less likely is an event to occur the more likely it is not to occur.
The occurrence of both of two events will not be more likely and will
generally be less likely than the occurrence of the less likely of the two.
But the occurrence of at least one of the events is not less likely and
is generally more likely than the occurrence of either” (Cox, 1946).
The quotation above is alleged to be a fundamental part of any coherent reasoning
and, based on it, some scholars claim that degrees of belief should be manipulated
according to the laws of probability theory (Cox, 1946; Jaynes, 1957; Caticha,
2009). The word “likely” could be replaced by “probable”, “possible”, “plausible”
or any other that represents a measure for our belief or (un)certainty under limited
knowledge. Dubois and Prade (2001) said that, under a limited knowledge,
“one agent that does not believe in a proposition does NOT imply the
(s)he believes in its negation”
and also that
“uncertainty in propositional logic is ternary and not binary: either a
proposition is believed, or its negation is believed, or neither of them
are believed”.
Therefore, under a limited knowledge, the claim that “the less possible is an event
to occur the more possible it is not to occur” is too restrictive to be of universal
applicability in general beliefs.
The Cox’s demonstration is made through associativity functional equations
(let G : R2 → R be a real function with two real arguments, then G(x,G(y, z)) =
G(G(x, y), z) is the associativity functional equation) that represent the second
sentence of the above quotation, the involved function (G) is considered continuous
and strictly increasing in both its arguments. However, when this function is
non-decreasing we also have a coherent reasoning (see Darwiche and Ginsberg,
1992) and other than additive rules emerge from this functional equation, such as
minimum (maximum) as demonstrated by Marichal (2000). Therefore, probability
is not the unique coherent way of dealing with uncertainties as usually thought
and spread among some scholars. Moreover, Dubois and Prade (2001) clarify that
probability theory is not a faithful representation of incomplete knowledge in the
sense of classical logic as usual considered.
In our case, the set that we want to define an objective state of belief is the
parameter space Θ. Here, the word “objective” means that no prior distributions
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over Θ are specified. Naturally there exists some level of subjective knowledge in
the choice of models, parameter space and so on, these sources of subjectivity will
not be discussed further. It is widely known that the frequentist school regards
no probability distributions over the subsets of Θ and that probability distribu-
tions are only assigned for observable randomized events. Here, we show that the
proposed s-value can prescribe an objective state of belief over the subsets of Θ
without assigning any prior subjective probability distributions over the subsets
of Θ. It is quite obvious that an s-value is not a probability measure, since it is
not additive. However, as we shall see in this section, s-values are indeed abstract
states of belief.
Abstract belief calculus (ABC) is built considering more basic axioms than
regarded in Cox derivation and, as a consequence, the additive property must be
generalized to a summation operator ⊕ such that the usual sum rule is a simple
particular case (this theory also deals with propositions instead of sets, but here
we consider that propositions are represented explicitly as sets). For the sake
of completeness, we expose the main components of the ABC theory in what
follows. Firstly, let L be a family of subsets Θ closed under unions, intersections
and complements. The ABC starts defining a function Φ : L → S called support
function, and for each A ∈ L, Φ(A) is called the support value of A. Then, in
order to define the properties of this support function, a partial support structure
〈S,⊕〉 is defined such that the summation support ⊕ : S × S → S satisfies the
following properties:
• Symmetry: a⊕ b = b⊕ a for every a, b ∈ S
• Associativity: (a⊕ b)⊕ c = a⊕ (b ⊕ c), for every a, b, c ∈ S
• Convexity: For every a, b, c ∈ S, such that (a⊕b)⊕c = a, then also a⊕b = a
• Zero element: There exists a unique 0 ∈ S such that a⊕ 0 = a for all a ∈ S
• Unit element: There exists a unique element 1 ∈ S, where 1 6= 0, such that
for each a ∈ S, there exists b ∈ S such that a⊕ b = 1
Then, the properties of Φ are the following
1. For A,B ∈ L, such that A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A, then Φ(A) = Φ(B)
2. For A,B ∈ L, such that A ∩B = ∅, then Φ(A ∪B) = Φ(A)⊕ Φ(B)
3. For A,B,C ∈ L, such that A ⊆ B ⊆ C and Φ(A) = Φ(C), then Φ(A) =
Φ(B)
4. Φ(∅) = 0 and Φ(Θ) = 1
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Backing to our proposal and taking S = [0, 1], ⊕ ≡ sup, 0 = 0, 1 = 1 and
Φ ≡ s we see, by Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, that the s-value satisfies all the properties
above. Therefore, for our problem, we identify that our s-value is acting precisely
as a support function Φ in the ABC formalism. It is noteworthy that the support
value of A does not determine the support value of Ac (the complement of A). This
determination happens in the probability calculus since, when S = [0, 1] and ⊕ ≡
+, the probabilities of sets that form a partition of the total space must sum up to
one. Then, for abstract support functions, Darwiche and Ginsberg (1992) defined
the degree of belief function Φ¨ : L → S×S, such that Φ¨(A) = 〈Φ(A),Φ(Ac)〉. The
value of Φ¨(A) is said to be the degree of belief of A. Naturally, for the probability
calculus this function is vacuous, since if S = [0, 1], ⊕ ≡ + and Φ is a probability
function then for any measurable subset A, Φ¨(A) = 〈Φ(A), 1 − Φ(A)〉.
Now, let a, b ∈ S, then if there exists c ∈ S such that a⊕ c = b we say that the
support value a is no greater than the support value b and we use the notation
a ⊕ b, the symbol ⊕ is called as support order. Darwiche and Ginsberg (1992)
showed that ⊕ is a partial order under which 0 is minimal and 1 is maximal.
Also, let Φ¨(A) = 〈a1, a2〉 and Φ¨(B) = 〈b1, b2〉 be degrees of beliefs of A and B,
respectively. We say that the degree of belief of A is no greater than the degree
of belief of B if a1 ⊕ b1 and b2 ⊕ b1, this is represented by Φ¨(A) ⊑⊕ Φ¨(B).
Darwiche and Ginsberg (1992) also showed that ⊑⊕ is a partial order under which
〈0,1〉 is minimal and 〈1,0〉 is maximal. In this coherent framework, Φ¨(A) = 〈1,1〉
is fully possible without having any contradictions (of course that in probability
measures this cannot happen). The authors clarified this in terms of propositions,
see the quotation below:
“A sentence is rejected precisely when it is supported to degree 0. And
a sentence is accepted only if it is supported to degree 1. But if the
sentence is supported to degree 1, it is not necessarily accepted. For
example, when degrees of support are S = {possible, impossible}, a
sentence and its negation could be possible. Here, both the sentence
and its negation are supported to degree possible, but neither is ac-
cepted.”
As our s-value is a support function for the subsets of Θ, we may used this
measure to state degrees of belief for the subsets of Θ. Notice that we cannot
do this with the usual concept of p-value by the following. If A ⊂ B ⊂ Θ,
then A e Ac ∩ B are disjoint sets, therefore as B = A ∪ (Ac ∩ B) we have by
Property 2 that Φ(B) = Φ(A) ⊕ Φ(Ac ∩ B) and then Φ(A) ⊕ Φ(B), that is,
if A is a subset of B the support value Φ(A) is no greater than the support
value Φ(B). By our Examples 1.1 and 1.2 we see that p-values do not satisfy
this requirement. As aforementioned, s-values are not probabilities measures on
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the subsets of Θ and this is not a weakness as some may argue. For instance,
for subsets of Θ with dimensions smaller than Θ, the best measure of evidence
that probability measures can provide is zero. We remark that p-values and the
Bayesian e-values (Pereira and Stern, 1999) are not probability measures on Θ,
moreover, usually defined p-values cannot even be included in the ABC formalism
to establish objective states of belief on the subsets of Θ. Hence, s-values can be
used to fill this gap.
Consider the null hypothesis H0 : θ ∈ Θ0, by Condition C1, we know that
θ̂ ∈ Θ0 or θ̂ ∈ Θc0, then s(Θ0) = 1 or s(Θc) = 1. As the s-value is a measure
of support and 〈0,1〉 is minimal and 〈1,0〉 is maximal, we can readily reject H
provided that Φ¨(Θ0) = 〈s(Θ0), s(Θc0)〉 = 〈0, 1〉 and readily accept H provided that
Φ¨(Θ0) = 〈s(Θ0), s(Θc0)〉 = 〈1, 0〉. In these two cases we have complete knowledge.
When Φ¨(Θ0) = 〈s(Θ0), s(Θc0)〉 = 〈1, 1〉 we have complete ignorance regarding this
specific hypothesis and cannot either accept or reject, then we must perform other
experiment for gathering more information. Typically, we have intermediate states
of knowledge, namely: (1) Φ¨(Θ0) = 〈a, 1〉 or (2) Φ¨(Θ0) = 〈1, b〉, where a, b ∈ [0, 1].
In the first case, we say that there is evidence against H0 if a is sufficiently small
(i.e., a < ac for some critical value ac) and we say that the decision is unknown
whenever a is not sufficiently small. In the second case, we say that there is
evidence in favor of H0 if b is sufficiently small (i.e., b < bc for some critical value
bc) and we say that the decision is unknown whenever b is not sufficient small.
The problem now is to define what is “sufficiently small” to perform a decision.
The decision rule may be derived through loss functions or other procedure, we
will study this issue in future works. Whatever the chosen procedure, it should
respect the minimal (Φ¨(Θ0) = 〈0, 1〉), maximal (Φ¨(Θ0) = 〈1, 0〉) and inconclusive
(Φ¨(Θ0) = 〈1, 1〉) features of possibility measures.
5 Examples
In this section we apply our proposal to the Examples 1.1 and 1.2 and we also
consider an example for the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium hypothesis.
Example 5.1. Consider Example 1.1, after a straightforward computation we find
Tθ = 2(ℓ(θ̂)− ℓ(θ)) = n(X¯ − µ)⊤(X¯ − µ),
where X¯ = (X¯1, X¯2)
⊤ and µ = (µ1, µ2)
⊤ and Fα is the α quantile from a quisquare
distribution with two degrees of freedom. Then, s-values for H01 : µ1 = µ2 = 0
and H02 : µ1 = µ2 are respectively s1 = 0.104 and s2 = 0.105. Note that the curve
µ1 = µ2 intercepts Λs2 at (−0.01,−0.01). As expected for this case, s1 < s2, since
Θ01 ⊂ Θ02, in addition, s1 and s2 are near each other because the variables are
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independent. If the variables were correlated, those s-values would differ drastically
(being s2 always greater than s1).
Example 5.2. Consider Example 1.2, the maximum likelihood estimates for b1
and b2 are respectively b̂1 = 0.1966 and b̂2 = −0.1821. Here, we find that
Tθ = 2(ℓ(θ̂)− ℓ(θ)) = (̂b − b)⊤(x⊤x)(̂b − b).
Then, Fα is the α quantile from a quisquare distribution with two degrees of freedom
and the s-values for H01 : b1 = 0, H02 : b2 = 0 and H03 : (b1, b2) = (0, 0) are
respectively s1 = 0.107, s2 = 0.135 and s3 = 0.101. Therefore, as expected by the
logical reasoning s1 > s3 and s2 > s3.
We also compare our results with the FBST approach considering a trinomial
distribution and the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium hypothesis.
Example 5.3. Consider that we observe a vector of three values x1, x2, x3, in
which the likelihood function is proportional to θx1
1
θx2
2
θx3
3
, where x1 + x2 + x3 = n
and the parameter space is Θ = {θ ∈ (0, 1)3 : θ1 + θ2 + θ3 = 1}. Here, we use the
same settings described in Section 4.3 by Pereira and Stern (1999), that is, the
null hypothesis is Θ0 =
{
θ ∈ Θ : θ3 = (1−
√
θ1)
2
}
and n = 20.
Table 6 presents the s-values for all values of x1 and x3. The last two columns
were taken from Table 2 of Pereira and Stern (1999). It should be said that we
computed the s-values by using Definition 2.3 instead of Relation (3), because
the p-values were presented with two decimal places in Pereira and Stern (1999)
and this can induce distorted s-values. As it was seen, our proposal yields similar
results to the FBST approach.
6 Discussion and final remarks
Berger and Sellke (1987) compare p-values with posterior probabilities (by us-
ing objective prior distributions) and find differences by an order of magnitude
(when testing a normal mean, data may produce a p-value of 0.05 and posterior
probability of the null hypothesis of at least 0.30). For an extensive review on
the relation between p-values and posterior probabilities, the reader is referred to
Ghosh et al. (2005). As opposed to posterior distributions, p-values do not hold
the requirement of evidence measures, but one can also conclude that posterior
probabilities cannot be used to reflect probabilities in a hypothetical long-run of
repeated sampling. Also, posterior probabilities cannot provide a measure of evi-
dence different from zero under sharp hypotheses (when the dimension of the null
parameter space is smaller than the full parameter space). A Bayesian procedure
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that provides a positive evidence measure under sharp hypotheses is the FBST.
In this context, s-values are directly comparable with the evidence measures of
the FBST approach. This latter procedure needs numerical integrations and max-
imizations, which may be difficult to be attained for high dimensional problems.
As we studied in previous sections, our procedure produces similar results to the
FBST and can be readily used as a classical alternative (when the user does not
want to specify prior distributions). Moreover, if one has a p-value computed via
likelihood ratio statistic, then Relation (3) may be applied to compute the respec-
tive s-value without any further computational procedures (maximizations and
integrations) and, also, this relation allows to derive the s-value distribution (if
desired). Also, we should mention that s-values, when computed using the asymp-
totic distribution of Tθ0 , do respect the famous likelihood principle, but we should
say that it is not the main concern here, it is just a property of our approach.
Naturally, if the exact distribution of Tθ0 is adopted, the likelihood principle may
be violated.
When the null hypothesis is simple and specifies the full vector of parameters,
say Θ0 = {θ0}, the proposed s-values are, in general, p-values (Schweder and Hjort,
2002). Otherwise, s-values cannot be interpreted as p-values, instead, they must
be treated as measures of evidence for null hypotheses. As aforementioned, when
treated as evidence measures, p-values have some internal undesirable features (in
some cases, for nested hypotheses H01 and H02, where H01 is nested within H02,
p-values might give more evidence against H02 than H01). On the other hand,
p-values respect the repeated sampling principle, that is, in the long-run average
actual error of rejecting a true hypothesis is not greater than the reported error.
In other words, as p-values have uniform distribution under the null hypothesis,
the frequency of observing p-values smaller than α is α. This is an external de-
sirable aspect, since this allows us to verify model assumptions and adequacy,
among many other things. The proposed s-values overcome that internal undesir-
able aspect of p-values, but the problem now is how to evaluate a critical value to
establish a decision rule for a hypothesis based on s-values (this decision should
respect the rules of possibility measures). If we want to respect the repeated sam-
pling principle, based on Lemma 3.3, we see that a critical value for s depends
on H0. To see that, let α be the chosen critical value for the computed p-value,
then it can be “corrected” to α′H0 = 1−F (F−1H0 (1−α)) for the respective s-value.
This threshold value α′H0 will respect the repeated sampling principle if and only
if it varies with H0. If we adopt this “corrected” critical value we will have the
same internal undesirable features of p-values. We must rely on other principles
to compute the threshold value for our s-value, maybe based on loss functions.
These loss functions may incorporate the scientific importance of a hypothesis to
elaborate a reasonable critical value (this issue will be discussed in future work). It
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is well known that statistical significance is not the same as scientific significance,
for a further discussion we refer the reader to Cox (1977). Naturally, we could
also employ loss functions on p-values to find a threshold, however, the internal
undesirable features of p-values will certainly bring problems to implement this
without any logical conflicts.
There are many open issues that need more attention regarding s-values. Next
we provide a list of open problems that we did not deal with in this article, but
will be subject of our future research.
1. To give a rigorous mathematical treatment when the log-likelihood function
ℓ is not strictly concave.
2. To derive a computational procedure to find s-values and their distribution
for (semi)algebraic subsets Θ0 and not strictly concave ℓ.
3. To compare theoretical properties of s-values by using other types of confi-
dence regions. Monte Carlo simulations may be required.
4. To compare s-values with evidence values (e-value) computed via FBST
(Pereira and Stern, 1999) and other procedures such as the posterior Bayes
factor (Aitkin, 1991) in a variety of models by using actual data.
5. To derive a criterion to advise one out of three decisions “acceptance”, “re-
jection” or “undecidable” of a null hypothesis without having any types of
conflict.
We end this paper by saying that we are not advocating a replacement of p-
values by s-values. Instead, we just recommend s-values as additional measures
to assist data analysis.
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Figure 1: Borders of confidence regions Λα, for different values of α. The dotted
line is Λs1 , where s1 is the s-value for testing H01 : θ1 = 0. The dot-dashed line
is Λs2 , where s2 is the s-value for testing H02 : θ2 = 0. The dashed line is Λs3 ,
where s3 is the s-value for testing H03 : θ
2
1 + θ
2
2 = 1.
Table 1: Tests of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium
x1 x3 s-value e-value p-value
(FBST)
1 2 0.00 0.01 0.00
1 3 0.02 0.01 0.01
1 4 0.04 0.04 0.02
1 5 0.10 0.09 0.04
1 6 0.20 0.18 0.08
1 7 0.33 0.31 0.15
1 8 0.50 0.48 0.26
1 9 0.68 0.66 0.39
1 10 0.84 0.83 0.57
1 11 0.95 0.95 0.77
1 12 1.00 1.00 0.99
1 13 0.96 0.96 0.78
1 14 0.85 0.84 0.55
1 15 0.68 0.66 0.33
1 16 0.48 0.47 0.16
1 17 0.29 0.27 0.05
1 18 0.13 0.12 0.00
5 0 0.01 0.02 0.01
5 1 0.10 0.09 0.04
5 2 0.32 0.29 0.14
5 3 0.63 0.61 0.34
5 4 0.90 0.89 0.65
5 5 1.00 1.00 1.00
5 6 0.91 0.90 0.66
5 7 0.69 0.66 0.39
5 8 0.44 0.40 0.20
5 9 0.24 0.21 0.09
5 10 0.11 0.09 0.04
9 0 0.12 0.21 0.09
9 1 0.68 0.66 0.39
9 2 0.99 0.99 0.91
9 3 0.87 0.86 0.59
9 4 0.53 0.49 0.26
9 5 0.24 0.21 0.09
9 6 0.08 0.06 0.03
9 7 0.02 0.01 0.01
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